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LEGAL PROFESSION 
Residency Requirements for Attorneys.· 
Home Is Where the License Is? 
by Neal Devins 
ISSUES 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
v. 
Piper 
(Docket No. 83-1466) 
To be argued October 31, 1984 
In our federal system, states' rights frequently con· 
flict with our interstate marketplace and the rights of 
American citizens to be afforded the same "privileges 
and immunities" in each state of the union. Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire v. Piper depicts one of these 
conflicts-the ability of states to regulate the practice of 
law. More specifically, the Piper case is concerned with 
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire's rule prohibit· 
ing nonresidents from becoming members of the state 
bar. 
Residence requirements are troublesome because 
free market principles temper the Constitution-prin· 
ciples which condemn anticompetitive practices. At the 
same time, our nation is a conglomerate of fifty indivi· 
dual states, each of which has unique laws, unique court 
systems and unique standards for lawyer competency. 
Consequently, our federal system demands that states 
have leeway to structure their legal system. 
Where national values end and states' rights begin is 
the subject matter of Piper. Should deference be given to 
flausible state justifications for the residency require-
ment, or must the state affirmatively demonstrate its 
need for the residency requirements? Since lawyers are 
"officers of the [state] court," should the state have more 
leeway in regulating the legal profession? And what, if 
any, weight should be accorded to the Supreme Court's 
recent trend of approving government rulemaking? 
The Court should provide answers to these questions 
in this case. Piper concerns the Privileges and Immuni· 
ties clause, which protects out-of-state workers' rights to 
seek employment in the open marketplace. It questions 
both the applicability of this protection to the New 
Hampshire residency requirement and the standard 
used in implementing this protection. 
Neal Devins is an allomey with the Civil Rights Commission, 
1121 Vermont Avmue, NW, Washing/on, DC 20425; tele-
phone(202) 376-8372. 
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FACTS 
Kathryn Piper, a Vermont resident, sought to be-
come a member of the New Hampshire bar. After sign-
ing a statement of intent to establish residency in New 
Hampshire, Piper took and passed the February, 1980, 
New Hampshire bar. She subsequently requested dis-
pensation from the residency requirement because of 
alleged personal circumstances. The New Hampshire 
Supreme Court denied her request. 
In March of 1982, Piper brought suit in federal 
district court, alleging that the residency requirement 
violated, among other things, the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause. The district court upheld her daim (539 F. 
Supp. 1064 (D.N.H. 1982)). A divided panel of the First 
Circuit United States Court of Appeals reversed this 
ruling (708 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1983)). However, this 
initial appellate court ruling was reversed upon en bane 
reconsideration (i.e., a proceeding in which all the First 
Circuit appellate judges participated) (723 F.2d 98 
{1983)). 
The thrust of Piper's claim concerns the constitu-
tional requirement that: "The citizens of each state shall 
be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens 
in the several states." According to the Supreme Court, 
this provision "prevents a state from discriminating 
against citizens of other states in favor of its own." (Ha-
gue v. Commillee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 
511 (1939)). Piper, citing several Supreme Court cases, 
claims that: "To justify discrimination under the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause, the state must establish the 
existence of a 'substantial reason' and as part of this 
justification show that nonresidents 'constitute a pecu-
liar source of evil at which the discrimination is aimed' ... 
[as well as] show that 'the degree of discrimination bears 
a close relation' to the reasons presented, as justifica-
tion." For Piper, the state has failed to meet this burden 
of justification. 
The state, however, challenges Piper's position on 
two grounds. First, it claims that its residency require-
ment does not implicate the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. It supports this argument with the allegation 
that "state court control over bar membership involves 
an activity which is directly connected and bound u'p 
with the state's exercise of its judicial power, rather than 
an interest fundamental to the promotion of interstate 
harmony." For the state, its requirement is not an eco-
nomic regulation. Thus, according to New Hampshire, 
state concerns outweigh the need to apply the Privileges 
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and Immunities Clause. In support of this claim, the 
state points to the Supreme Court's admonition that "the 
national government will fare best if the states and their 
institutions are free to perform their separate functions 
in their separate ways." (Youuger v. Han·is, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971)). 
The state's second argument, that it has adequate 
justification for prohibiting nonresident applications to 
the state bar, centers around the standards that should 
govern Privileges and Immunities Clause analysis. The 
state claims that deference should be accorded to the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court ruling that New 
Hampshire's substantial interest in promoting "the con-
tinued validity of a competent, stable and well informed 
state bar" supports the residency requirement. The state 
further notes that the residency requirement is substan-
tially related to the New Hampshire Supreme Court's 
views of the obligations of New Hampshire lawyers. The 
state then delineates the "peculiar evils" posed by non-
resident applicants: "[N]onresident attorneys, once ad-
mitted, are less likely to remain familiar with legal rules 
and procedures and less likely to keep attuned to local 
conditions which may affect the needs of their local 
clients. Similarly, nonresident attorneys are less likely to 
be subject to local peer pressure which imposes in-
formal, but powerful curbs on unethical or incompetent 
conduct through the regular practice of law in a relati-
vely small and closely knit legal community. Also, nonre-
sident attorneys are less likely to be available for court 
appearances, disciplinary proceedings and participation 
in the voluntary activities of a unified bar." Because of 
these alleged dangers, the state argues that its residency 
requirement places a justifiable burden on out-of-state 
applicants. 
Piper disputes both claims proffered by the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court. First, she argues that the 
New Hampshire residency rule is indeed subject to scru-
tiny under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Citing 
the Supreme Court's 1984 ruling in United Buildiug v. 
Camden ( 104 S.Ct. at 1 028), that the clause is triggered 
by "discrimination against out-of-state residents on mat-
ters of fundamental concern," Piper argues that the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause is not restricted to 
economic regulation. She further argues that there 
should be no "political function" exemption because 
lawyers are "officers of the court." To support this con-
tention, Piper points to a Supreme Court Equal Protec-
tion Clause ruling which held that a law license does not 
"place one so close to the core of the r..olitical process as 
to make him a formulator of government policy." (/11 re 
Griffiths,413 U.S. 717, 729(1973)). 
After arguing that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause should apply to her case, Piper contends that the 
state cannot justify its residency requirement under the 
clause. Upon reviewing the state's proffered justifica-
tions for the residency rule, she concludes that the state 
Issue No.3 
has "failed to provide any legitimate substantial reason 
for its residency rule which is closely related to the actual 
terms of that rule." Specifically, Piper alleges: I) resi-
dency is not necessarily related to where an attorney 
intends to practice, for she intended to join a New 
Hampshire law office; 2) since residents, upon leaving 
the state, do not lose their bar membership, the resi-
dency requirement is not rationally related to the Su-
preme Court's stated objectives; 3) there is no reason to 
think that the bar exam could not adequately test nonre-
sidents' familiarity with local rules and procedures, and 
4) there is no·reason to think that out-of-state attorneys 
are either unconcerned with their reputations or unavai-
lable for court appearances or other required activities. 
In addition to suggesting that the state has failed to 
adequately support its residency requirement, Piper 
notes that less restrictive alternatives are available to the 
state to ensure adequate commitment to the New 
Hampshire Bar. For example, she suggests that nonresi-
dent attorneys could be compelled to maintain a New 
Hampshire office. 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The holding in Piper will be significant for several 
reasons. Most obviously, the case will have great practi-
cal impact on nonresident attorneys interested in being 
licensed in states with residency requirements. Several 
states now require (or are considering requiring) that 
bar applicants must either be a resident of the state or 
intend to open a law office in the state. For this reason, 
amicus briefs supporting the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court were filed by several states, including Tennessee, 
Iowa, Virginia, Missouri, and Ohio. For identical rea-
sons, an amicus brief in support of Kathryn Piper was 
filed by the Vermont Bar Association. 
Piper also is noteworthy to consumers of legal serv-
ices. New Hampshire's residency requirement is, in part, 
a consumer regulation. In its brief, the· state suggests 
that nonresident attorneys will provide inadequate legal 
services. Yet Ralph Nader's Public Citizens, Inc. and the 
American Corporate Counsel Association filed amicus 
briefs arguing that the state residency requirement im-
properly interferes with consumer choice. Public Citi-
zens claims that the end of "assuring that clients will be 
well served by honest and capable attorneys" is best 
accomplished "by allowing qualified nonresidents to be-
come members of the New Hampshire Bar and thereby 
increase the pool of attorneys available to represent 
clients." The consumerism argument advanced by the 
American Corporate Counsel speaks to the needs of 
corporations to have in-house attorneys represent them 
in court, on the reasoning these attorneys are intimately 
familiar with both the internal workings of the corpora-
tions they represent and the industries served by those 
corporations. 
In addition to these practical aspects, Piper will give 
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the Court an opportunity to speak generally about such 
concerns as the nature of legal practice and the balanc-
ing of states' rights with constitutional protections 
against anticompetitive state practices. Of particular in-
terest is the question of whether bar examiners in-
creased reliance on multistate examinations combined 
with the growth of "national" Jaw firms has weakened 
the state's interest in regulating the legal profession. 
The case also raises a significant issue that could 
impact on future Privileges and Immunities Clause ju-
risprudence. When government largesse is at issue, 
should the state be accorded more deference in regula-
tions impacting on nonresidents than when free-stand-
ing regulations are at issue? Last term, the Supreme 
Court approved a residency requirement imposed by 
Camden, New Jersey, on public works contracts. If the 
Courl now upholds Piper's claim, the largesse-regula-
tion distinction could prove dispositive. 
ARGUMENTS 
For Kathryn Piper (Cout1sel of Record, jon Meyer, I 16 Lowell 
Street, P. 0. Box 516, J"'anchester, NH 03105; telephone (603) 
668-7272) 
I. The New Hampshire residency rule is subject to 
Privileges and Immunities Clause scrutiny. 
2. The New Hampshire residency rule violates the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause as the state has failed to 
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provide any legitimate, substantial reason for the resi-
dency rule which is closely related to the actual terms 
of the rule. 
3. 'fhe New Hampshire residency requirement violates 
the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. (These 
issues were not of such significance as to merit dis-
cussion.) 
For the Supreme Court of New Hampshire (CourlSe/ of 
Record, Marlin L. Gross, 9 Capitol Street, P. 0. Box I 256, 
Concord, NH 03301; telephone (603) 224-2341) 
I. New Hampshire's residency requirement is bo.und up 
with the state's exercise of its judicial power and thus 
does not trigger Privileges and Immunities Clause 
scrutiny. 
2. If the Privileges and Immunities Clause is invoked, 
substantial deference should be accorded the policy 
determination made by the state of New Hampshire. 
3. New Hampshire satisfies the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause test since the residency requirement is 
substantially related to the state supreme court's view 
of the obligations of New Hampshire lawyers. 
AMICUS ARGUMENTS 
Parties and positions of the amici have been summa-
rized in the "Background and Significance" section. 
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